
%Changes here (in the main paper I'll just invoke this file)
\subsection*{Abstract}
Voting audit logs produced by electronic voting systems contain
information that is useful for uncovering procedural errors and
election anomalies, but they are currently unwieldy and difficult for
election officials to use in post-election audits. In this work, we
develop new methods to analyze these audit logs for the
detection of both procedural errors and system deficiencies. Our
methods can be used to detect votes that were not included in the
final tally, machines that may have experienced hardware problems
during the election, and polling locations that closed late or had
voters waiting in line for extended periods. We tested our analyses on
data from the South Carolina 2010 elections and were able to uncover, 
solely through the analysis of audit logs, that there were 1127 votes
not counted in the certified totals in Richland County, South
Carolina. We created a public web application that applies these
methods to uploaded audit logs and generates useful feedback on any
detected issues. 


